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Abstract
This paper introduces the use of static information flow
analysis for the specification and enforcement of end-to-
end availability policies in programs. We generalize the de-
centralized label model, which is about confidentiality and
integrity, to also include security policies for availability.
These policies characterize acceptable risks by representing
them as principals. We show that in this setting, a suitable
extension of noninterference corresponds to a strong, end-
to-end availability guarantee. This approach provides a nat-
ural way to specify availability policies and enables exist-
ing static dependency analysis techniques to be adapted for
availability. The paper presents a simple language in which
fine-grained information security policies can be specified
as type annotations. These annotations can include require-
ments for all three major security properties: confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability. The type system for the lan-
guage provably guarantees that any well-typed program has
the desired noninterference properties, ensuring confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability.
1. Introduction
Although availability is often considered one of the three
key aspects of information security (along with confiden-
tiality and integrity), availability assurance has been largely
divorced from other security concerns. This paper starts to
bridge the gap by giving a single, common framework for
reasoning about confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The first part of this framework is a language for specify-
ing confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies. This
policy language extends the decentralized label model [21],
and thus is able to describe security policies involving mu-
tually distrusting principals.
The second part of the framework is a semantics for
the policy language, which characterizes precisely what it
means for a system to enforce a policy. In the context of con-
fidentiality and integrity, end-to-end security policies have
generally been interpreted as information flow policies re-
quiring that the system obey noninterference. As this paper
shows, availability policies too can be interpreted as requir-
ing a form of noninterference.
The third part of the framework is a static program anal-
ysis for enforcing confidentiality, integrity, and availability
policies. Previous work has shown that it is possible to en-
force end-to-end confidentiality and integrity properties by
static, compile-time analysis of program text (for a survey
see [24]). What is new here is a demonstration that the same
approach applies to availability: an availability analysis can
be expressed in tractable form as a programming language
type system that also enforces confidentiality and integrity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
new policy language for expressing requirements for avail-
ability, integrity, and confidentiality. Section 3 instantiates
this label system as program annotations in a simple pro-
gramming language. Section 4 uses the operational seman-
tics of the language to express trace-based security proper-
ties that correspond to availability, integrity, and confiden-
tiality policies. Section 5 gives a type system for this pro-
gramming language and states the corresponding security
theorem: well-typed programs are semantically secure (see
the appendix for proofs). Section 6 extends the simple pro-
gramming language to express richer notions of availabil-
ity and also to describe some aspects of distributed systems.
Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Availability policies
We begin by precisely defining what is meant by “avail-
ability”; then we define an expressive policy language for
availability, and we demonstrate the policy language can be
used for confidentiality and integrity too.
2.1. Availability
A system output is considered to be available if it will
be produced eventually. The output does not have to be
correct—that is the province of integrity.
There are two common ways to specify availability.
The first approach is to quantify system reliability using
measurable criteria, such as the failure probability or the
MTTF/MTTR (mean time to fail / mean time to recover) ra-
tio [27]. The second approach is to specify failure factors
(factors that could cause the system to fail), for example,
the minimum number of host failures needed to bring down
the system [25]. We adopt this second approach here.
The above description of availability glosses over an-
other aspect of availability: timeliness. How soon does an
output have to occur in order to be considered to be avail-
able? For real-time services, there may be hard time bounds
beyond which a late output is useless. Reasoning about how
long it takes to generate an output adds considerable com-
plexity, so for now let us consider an output to be available
if it arrives eventually. Section 6 presents an extension to
this framework that supports reasoning about timeliness.
2.2. Failures and principals
We assume that the unavailability of a system output is
attributed to a failure. There are many kinds of possible fail-
ures: for example, hardware failures such as losing power,
software failures such as subversion by an attacker, and hu-
man failures such as a user who provides incorrect or even
malicious inputs. Our goal is a policy language that can de-
scribe all these kinds of failures and how the availability of
the system should be affected by them.
We consider a failure to be the malfunction of a prin-
cipal, an entity that may affect the behavior of a system.
Therefore, a failure can be denoted by the responsible prin-
cipal. For some failures, the corresponding principal is sim-
ply an abstract name, which might represent hardware,
users, attacks or defense mechanisms, as shown in the fol-
lowing examples:
• power: the main power supply of a system, whose fail-
ure may bring down the entire system.
• root: the “superuser”, which has the ability to control
(or shut down) a system, and to act on behalf of users.
• DDoS1000: a distributed denial of service attack
launched from 1000 machines. This principal can be
used to specify the availability of a system that tol-
erates DDoS attacks launched from fewer than 1000
machines.
• puzzle: the puzzle generated by a puzzle-based de-
fense mechanism [13] for DoS attacks. This princi-
pal fails if attackers can feasibly solve the puzzle and
launch DoS attacks successfully.
More complex failure scenarios are described by using
composite principals [1]. For example, suppose that there is
a principal ups representing a back-up power supply. And
to make the system unavailable, both power and ups need
to fail. This joint failure is represented by a composite prin-
cipal given by the conjunction power∧ups.
More generally, principals p may be constructed using
conjunction and disjunction operators ∧ and ∨:
p ::= a | p1∧p2 | p1∨p2
The notation a is an abstract name representing a principal.
The composite principal p1 ∧ p2 represents a joint failure
factor: p1∧p2 fails only if both p1 and p2 fail. Another con-
structor ∨ is used to construct a group (disjunction): princi-
pal p1∨p2 represents a failure that happens if either p1 or p2
fails. For example, the principal root∨power can make a
system fail if the superuser and the power supply each can
cause the failure.
To demonstrate the expressiveness of this principal lan-
guage, we specify the availability of a quorum system [17].
A quorum system is a collection {Q1, . . . , Qn} of sets (quo-
rums) of hosts, every two of which intersect. A quorum sys-
tem is available as long as there is some quorum in which
no hosts fail. Therefore, a quorum system cannot tolerate
the failure of a set of hosts B such that for every quorum
Qi, B ∩ Qi is not empty. Thus, if the principal h repre-
sents a host, availability of a quorum system can be speci-
fied by the principal
∨
B | ∀Qi.B∩Qi 6=∅(
∧
h∈B h).
2.3. Principal hierarchy
We write p1 º p2 if the principal p1 acts for another
principal p2—that is, p1 has all the powers of p2 and is at
least as trustworthy [21]. Interpreting principals as failure
factors, this means the failure of p1 is worse than the failure
of p2 (or the same). The acts-for relation is useful for an-
alyzing availability, because p1 º p2 means that the avail-
ability represented by p1 is at least as high as the availabil-
ity represented by p2. For example, if hosts h1 and h2 are
two principals, then h1∧h2 º h1 holds because h1 fails
if both h1 and h2 fail. And information with the availabil-
ity h1∧h2 also achieves the availability h1, because if h1
does not fail, h1∧h2 does not fail.
The acts-for relation between principals creates a princi-
pal hierarchy H, an ordering (actually, a pre-order) on the
set of principals. By the definition of acts-for, a principal hi-
erarchy must satisfy the following deductive rules:
p1∧p2 º p1 p1 º p2 p2 º p3
p1 º p3
p1 º p2
p1 º p2∨p3
p1 º p3 p2 º p3
p1∨p2 º p3
p1 º p2 p1 º p3
p1 º p2∧p3
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2.4. Owned policies
An end-to-end availability policy specifies the availabil-
ity that a user requires of a system input or output. In this
work, availability is specified as a principal representing
a failure factor. Accordingly, an availability policy has the
form u : p, where principal u is the policy owner (the user
who specifies the policy), and principal p represents the re-
quired availability. For example, if Alice specifies the avail-
ability policy Alice : h1∧h2 on one of her files, it means
that Alice requires the file to be available if hosts h1 and h2
do not both fail.
In general, security (including availability) rests on as-
sumptions. In particular, the enforcement of a policy owned
by user u is contingent on the assumptions made by u. For
example, system security commonly depends on a trusted
computing base (TCB). If the assumption that the TCB is
trustworthy is false, security may not be enforced. In a sys-
tem with mutual distrust, such as a distributed system cross-
ing administrative domains, different users might assume
different components of the system trustworthy. Thus it is
important to specify policy owners explicitly to indicate
whose assumptions are relevant to policy enforcement.
We build on the decentralized label model (DLM) [21],
which applies the notion of policy ownership to confiden-
tiality and integrity. In the DLM, a confidentiality or in-
tegrity policy has the form u : p1, . . . , pn, meaning that u
allows only principals p1, . . . , pn to read or update the in-
formation protected by the policy. Using disjunctive princi-
pals, the policy u : p1, . . . , pn can be written in the form
u : p1 ∨ . . .∨ pn, just like an availability policy. Further-
more, for each security property (confidentiality, integrity
or availability), a policy u : p can be interpreted as an as-
sumption by u that p does not fail. A confidentiality policy
u : p means that u requires the data will remain confiden-
tial as long as p does not fail to keep it confidential. For in-
tegrity, u requires the data will have integrity unless p fails
to provide correct data. As an availability policy, it says that
u requires that the data is available if p does not fail.
Based on this commonality, we can separate a notion of
owned policies from the security properties these policies
apply to. Let pi abstractly represent a security property of
the system; it may be a confidentiality, integrity, or avail-
ability property. Formally, we treat pi as an abstract proposi-
tion that is true if the corresponding security property holds,
and false otherwise. In general, if the policy u :p is applied
to a security property pi, it means that u requires pi to hold
if p does not fail.
Treating owned policies separately from the underlying,
abstract security properties is useful for two reasons. First,
it enables a uniform semantics for security policies. Second,
it may in general be infeasible to formally specify or ana-
lyze what it means for a security property to hold, particu-
larly if the security violation might occur outside the com-
puting system; some form of abstraction is needed. This ab-
straction does not create a problem for security enforcement
as long as the dependencies between security properties in-
duced by a computing system can be analyzed precisely.
2.5. Policy semantics
Whether the policy u : p is applied to confidentiality, in-
tegrity, or availability properties, it corresponds to two se-
curity assumptions: that p does not fail, and the assumptions
made by u are true.
These assumptions can be formalized as a proposition σ
using the following syntax:
σ ::= ok p | σ1∧σ2 | σ1∨σ2
where ok p means that principal p does not fail. The prop-
erties of the acts-for relation can be captured formally us-
ing these propositions. If p1 acts for p2, this means the fail-
ure of p1 implies the failure of p2:
ok p2 ⇒ ok p1 iff p1 º p2 (1)
Consequently, composite principals satisfy the following
conditions:
ok p1 ∨ ok p2 iff ok (p1∧p2)
ok p1 ∧ ok p2 iff ok (p1∨p2)
In addition, we assume there exists an assumption config-
uration Σ that maps each principal u to its assumptions
σ = Σ(u). In general, if u1 º u2, then any assumption
made by u1 is considered an assumption made by u2. Con-
sequently, Σ must satisfy the following condition:
u1 º u2 ⇒ (Σ(u2)⇒ Σ(u1)) (2)
A security policy can be given a formal semantics in
terms of these propositions. Using brackets [[·]] to indicate
the semantic function, the meaning of a policy u :p is:
[[u :p]] = Σ(u) ∧ ok p
Suppose a policy P is applied to a security property pi. Then
the meaning of the policy is a characterization of when the
property is guaranteed to hold. To enforce the policy is to
guarantee pi under the assumption that [[P ]] is true, that is, to
ensure [[P ]]⇒ pi.
Consider the example of enforcing the availability policy
Alice : h1∧h2 on Alice’s file. The goal is to ensure that
the file is available under the assumption that Σ(Alice) ∧
ok(h1∧h2) is true. Therefore, one way to enforce the policy
is to replicate the file on hosts h1 and h2 because ok (h1∧
h2) means that h1 and h2 cannot both fail, which ensures
that at least one host is available to serve accesses to the file.
Moreover, if Σ(Alice) implies ok h3, storing the file on h3
is another way to enforce the policy.
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2.6. Dependency analysis and policy ordering
A system processes inputs and produces outputs, creat-
ing dependencies between security properties of those in-
puts and outputs. Such dependencies capture influences of
the system on security and induce constraints on security
policies. For example, consider a system running the fol-
lowing pseudo-code:
while (i > 0) skip;
send i to o;
This program sends the input i to the output o if the value
of i is not positive. Otherwise, the program diverges, so the
output is unavailable. Thus, the availability of o depends on
the integrity of i. For simplicity, suppose there is only one
policy applied to these properties, and let Ao represent the
availability policy of o, and Ii represent the integrity pol-
icy of i. Then [[Ao]] ⇒ [[Ii]] must hold in order to enforce
Ao. If [[Ao]] 6⇒ [[Ii]], then [[Ao]] and ¬[[Ii]] may both hold.
In this case the integrity of i is not guaranteed, and the pro-
gram may compromise the availability of o. But this vio-
lates the availability policy Ao because [[Ao]] holds.
In general, given two security properties pi1 and pi2,
and their policies P1 and P2, if pi1 depends on pi2, then
[[P1]] ⇒ [[P2]] must hold in order to enforce P1. The con-
straint [[P1]] ⇒ [[P2]] corresponds to a natural ordering on
the two policies: P2 is at least as strong as P1, written
P1 ≤ P2, meaning that for any configuration Σ and any se-
curity property pi, P1 is enforced on pi if P2 is enforced on
pi. It is clear that P1 ≤ P2 is equivalent to ∀Σ.[[P1]]⇒ [[P2]].
The quantification over Σ ensures that analyses based on the
policy ordering are insensitive to Σ.
From the semantics of policies and formulas (1) and (2)
in Section 2.5, the following rule for ordering policies im-
mediately follows:
[CP ] u2 º u1 p2 º p1
u1 :p1 ≤ u2 :p2
2.7. Combining owned policies
In general, different principals may have different secu-
rity requirements. It is convenient to incorporate the security
policies of several principals into one entity so that they can
be analyzed and manipulated together. This is accomplished
by writing a set of policies β = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where each
Pi is an owned policy ui : pi applied to the same security
property.
A combined policy β is enforced if and only if all the
policies in β are enforced. As a result, the security assump-
tion described by β must be weaker than or equal to the se-
curity assumptions described by policies in β. Therefore,
the semantics of β is the proposition [[β]] =
∨
P∈β [[P ]]. Just
as with simple policies, combined policy β2 is as strong as
combined policy β1, written β1 ≤ β2, if ∀Σ. [[β1]] ⇒ [[β2]].
From the semantics, the≤ ordering on policies can be lifted
up to an ordering on combined policies by the following
rule:
∀P ∈ β1. ∃P ′ ∈ β2. P ≤ P ′
β1 ≤ β2
Importantly, the set of all the combined policies form a
lattice with the following join (unionsq) and meet (u) operations:
β1 unionsq β2 = β1 ∪ β2
β1 u β2 = {u1∨u2 :p1∨p2 | u1 :p1 ∈ β1 ∧ u2 :p2 ∈ β2}
The join and meet operations are sound with respect to the
policy semantics, because it is easily shown that [[β1unionsqβ2]] =
[[β1]] ∨ [[β2]] and [[β1 u β2]] = [[β1]] ∧ [[β2]].
Having a lattice of policies supports static program anal-
ysis [7]. For example, consider an addition expression e1 +
e2. Let A(e1) and A(e2) represent the availability policies
of the results of e1 and e2. Since the result e1 + e2 is avail-
able if and only if the results of e1 and e2 are both avail-
able, we have A(e1 + e2) ≤ A(e1) and A(e1 + e2) ≤
A(e2). Because the policies form a lattice, A(e1 + e2) =
A(e1) u A(e2) is the least restrictive availability policy we
can assign to the result of e1 + e2. Dually, if C(e1) and
C(e2) are the confidentiality policies of e1 and e2, then
C(e1) ≤ C(e1+e2) and C(e2) ≤ C(e1+e2). The least re-
strictive confidentiality policy that can be assigned to the re-
sult of e1 + e2 is C(e1) unionsq C(e2).
2.8. Security labels
In general, a system will need to simultaneously enforce
policies for confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
information it manipulates. These policies can be applied
to information as security labels. A label ` is written as a
triple 〈βC , βI , βA〉, where βC represents the (possibly com-
bined) policy for confidentiality, βI represents the integrity
policy, and βA represents availability. The notations C(`),
I(`), and A(`) represent the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability components of `.
For example, suppose expression e1 has a security label
`1, and e2 has label `2. Then e1 + e2 has a label 〈C(`1) unionsq
C(`2), I(`1) u I(`2), A(`1) uA(`2)〉.
3. Applying policies to computation
In this paper, a system is modeled by a program with
which users (including attackers) can interact only by af-
fecting its inputs and observing its outputs. Security
policies, including confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity policies, are specified on the inputs and outputs of a
program. This section shows this approach with a sim-
ple programming language.
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3.1. Security model
This section introduces two security assumptions that en-
ables enforcing security policies in a system by noninterfer-
ence. One assumption specifies which policies are already
enforced, and the other designates the power of attackers.
Our goal is to ensure that a program does not allow at-
tackers to violate its security policies at run time. A pro-
gram itself has no influence on how its inputs are generated
or how its outputs are used by external users. Therefore,
a program is not responsible for the enforcement of the in-
tegrity and availability policies of its inputs, or the confiden-
tiality policies of its outputs. Therefore, we have the follow-
ing security assumption:
SA1 Confidentiality policies specified on inputs,
and integrity and availability policies specified on
outputs are already enforced.
We are interested in the security violations that may be
caused by attackers, and we assume that the power of an at-
tacker is limited to affecting the inputs and observing the
outputs of the system. This leads to our second security as-
sumption:
SA2 If the integrity or availability of an output
is compromised by attackers, it is because the in-
tegrity or availability of some input is compro-
mised by attackers.
By (SA1) and (SA2), the availability policy Ao specified
on an output o can be enforced by a noninterference prop-
erty: the availability of the output o is not interfered by the
availability of any input whose availability policy is not as
strong as Ao, or the value of any input whose integrity pol-
icy is not as strong as Ao.
Indeed, suppose the output o is made unavailable by at-
tackers. By (SA2), it is because the availability or integrity
of some input i is compromised by attackers. Without loss
of generality, suppose the availability of i is compromised.
Let Ai be the availability policy of i. By (SA1), Ai is en-
forced, which, plus the unavailability of i, implies that [[Ai]]
is false. By the noninterference property, we have Ao ≤ Ai,
which implies [[Ao]] ⇒ [[Ai]]. Thus, [[Ao]] is false because
[[Ai]] is false. Therefore, the unavailability of o implies that
[[Ao]] is false. In other words, if [[Ao]] is true, then o must be
available, which means that Ao is enforced.
One advantage of enforcing an availability policy by
noninterference is to avoid proving that a program will
eventually produce an output, which generally amounts to
solving the halting problem.
3.2. The Aimp programming language
It is well known that confidentiality and integrity poli-
cies can be enforced by static program analyses that ver-
Values v ::= n | none
Expressions e ::= n | !m | e1 + e2
Statements s ::= skip | m := e | s1; s2
| if e then s1 else s2
| while e do s
Figure 1. Syntax of Aimp
ify whether a program satisfies a noninterference prop-
erty [30, 11, 32]. Since availability policies also correspond
to a noninterference property in our security model, a static
program analysis can be used to determine whether a system
satisfies these policies. We now demonstrate this approach
by formally representing the system as a program written in
a security-typed imperative language called Aimp.
The Aimp language is a basic imperative language
with assignments, sequential composition, condition-
als and loops. What distinguishes Aimp from other
security-typed imperative languages [30] is the value none,
which is used to represent unavailability: a value is un-
available if and only if it is none. Intuitively, there are three
rules on using the value none:
• The value none cannot appear in program code.
• The result of expression e is none if the evaluation of
e depends on none.
• The execution of a statement gets stuck if the execu-
tion depends on none.
A program of Aimp is just a statement, and the state of
a program is captured by a memory M that maps memory
references (memory locations) to values. We assume that
memory is observable to users, so memory references can
be used to represent I/O channels. A reference represent-
ing an input is called an input reference. If the value of an
input reference is none, then the corresponding input is un-
available. Similarly, a reference representing an output is
called an output reference. Suppose m is an output refer-
ence, then the corresponding output becomes available if m
is assigned an integer value. An unassigned output refer-
ence represents an output still expected by users.
The syntax of Aimp is shown in Figure 1. Let m range
over memory locations. In Aimp, values include integer n,
and none. Expressions include integer n, dereference ex-
pression !m, and addition expression e1+e2. Note that none
is not a valid expression so that it cannot appear in program
text. Statements include the empty statement skip, the as-
signment statement m := e, sequential composition s1; s2,
if and while statements.
Let β range over a lattice L of base labels, such as poli-
cies as defined in Section 2. The top and bottom elements
of L are represented by > and ⊥, respectively. The syntax
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for types in Aimp is shown as follows:
Base labels β ∈ L
Labels `, pc ::= 〈βC , βI , βA〉
Types τ ::= int` | int` ref | stmtR
In Aimp, the only data type is int`, an integer type anno-
tated with security label `, which contains three base labels
as described in Section 2.8.
A memory referencem has type int` ref, indicating the
value stored at m has type int`. In Aimp, types of mem-
ory references are specified by a typing assignment Γ that
maps references to types so that the type of m is τ ref if
Γ(m) = τ .
The type of a statement s has the form stmtR where R
contains the set of unassigned output references when s ter-
minates. Intuitively,R represents all the outputs that are still
expected by users after s terminates.
3.3. Operational semantics
The small-step operational semantics of Aimp is given
in Figure 2. Let M represent a memory that is a finite map
from locations to values (including none), and let 〈s, M〉
be a machine configuration. Then a small evaluation step is
a transition from 〈s, M〉 to another configuration 〈s′, M ′〉,
written 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉.
The evaluation rules (S1)–(S6) are standard for an imper-
ative language. Rules (E1) and (E2) are used to evaluate ex-
pressions. Because an expression has no side-effect, we use
the notation 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v to mean that evaluating e in mem-
ory M results in the value v. Rule (E1) is used to evaluate
dereference expression !m. In rule (E2), v1 + v2 is com-
puted using the following formula:
v1 + v2 =
{
n1 + n2 if v1 = n1 and v2 = n2
none if v1 = none or v2 = none
Rules (S1), (S4) and (S5) show that if the evaluation of
configuration 〈s, M〉 depends on the result of an expression
e, it must be the case that 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n. In other words, if
〈e, M〉 ⇓ none, the evaluation of 〈s, M〉 gets stuck.
3.4. Examples
By its simplicity, the Aimp language helps focus on the
essentials of an imperative language. Figure 3 shows a few
code segments that demonstrate various kind of availability
dependencies, some of which are subtle. In all these exam-
ples, mo represents an output, and its initial value is none.
All other references represent inputs.
In code segment (A), if m1 is unavailable, the execution
gets stuck at the first assignment. Therefore, the availability
of mo depends on the availability of m1.
[E1 ] m ∈ dom(M)〈!m, M〉 ⇓M(m)
[E2 ] 〈e1, M〉 ⇓ v1 〈e2, M〉 ⇓ v2 v = v1 + v2〈e1 + e2, M〉 ⇓ v
[S1 ] 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n〈m := e, M〉 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→ n]〉
[S2 ]
〈s1, M〉 7−→ 〈s′1, M ′〉
〈s1; s2, M〉 7−→ 〈s′1; s2, M ′〉
[S3 ] 〈skip; s, M〉 7−→ 〈s, M〉
[S4 ] 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n > 0〈if e then s1 else s2, M〉 7−→ 〈s1, M〉
[S5 ] 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n ≤ 0〈if e then s1 else s2, M〉 7−→ 〈s2, M〉
[S6 ] 〈while e do s, M〉 7−→〈if e then s; while e do s else skip, M〉
Figure 2. Operational semantics for Aimp
(A) m2:=!m1; mo:= 1;
(B) while (!m1) do skip; mo:=1;
(C) if (!m1) then while (1) do skip; else skip;
mo:=1;
(D) if (!m1) then mo:=1 else skip;
while (!m2) do skip;
mo:=2;
Figure 3. Examples
In code segment (B), the while statement gets stuck if
m1 is unavailable. Moreover, it diverges if the value of m1
is positive. Thus, the availability of mo depends on both the
availability and the value of m1.
In code segment (C), the if statement does not terminate
if m1 is positive, so the availability of mo depends on the
value of m1.
In code segment (D), mo is assigned in one branch of the
if statement, but not in the other. Therefore, when the if
statement terminates, the availability of mo depends on the
value ofm1. Moreover, the program executes a while state-
ment that may diverge beforemo is assigned value 2. There-
fore, for the whole program, the availability of mo depends
on the value of m1.
6
4. Noninterference properties
This section formalizes the noninterference properties
(in particular, availability noninterference) that correspond
to the security policies of Section 2. Although this formal-
ization is done in the context of Aimp, it can be easily gen-
eralized to other state transition systems.
For both confidentiality and integrity, noninterfer-
ence has a simple, intuitive description: equivalent
low-confidentiality (high-integrity) inputs always re-
sult in equivalent low-confidentiality (high-integrity) out-
puts. The notion of availability noninterference is more
subtle, because an attacker has two ways to compro-
mise the availability of an output. First, the attacker can
make an input unavailable and block the computation us-
ing the input. Second, the attacker can try to affect the in-
tegrity of control flow and make the program diverge (fail
to terminate). In other words, the availability of an out-
put may depend on both the integrity and availability of an
input. The observation is captured by this intuitive descrip-
tion of availability noninterference:
With all high-availability inputs available, equiva-
lent high-integrity inputs will eventually result in
equally available high-availability outputs.
As far as we are aware, no previous work has proposed a no-
tion of noninterference between the availability of outputs
and both the integrity and availability of inputs. This formu-
lation of noninterference provides a separation of concerns
(and policies) for availability and integrity, yet prevents the
two attacks discussed above.
The intuitive concepts of high and low security are based
on the power of the potential attacker, which is represented
by a base label L. In the DLM, suppose the attacker is able
to act for principals p1, . . . , pn, and that there exists a top
principal (denoted by ∗) that acts for every principal. Then
we have L = {∗ : p1∧. . .∧pn}, because p1∧. . .∧pn is the
most powerful principal that the attacker controls. Given a
base label β, if β ≤ L then the label represents a low-
security level that is not protected from the attacker. Oth-
erwise, β is a high-security label.
For an imperative language, the inputs of a program are
just the initial memory, and the outputs are the observable
aspects of a program execution, which is defined by the ob-
servation model of the language. In Aimp, we have the fol-
lowing observation model:
• Memories are observable.
• The value none is not observable. In other words, if
M(m) = none, an observer cannot determine the
value of m in M .
Suppose s is a program, and M is the initial memory. Based
on the observation model, the outputs of s are a set T of fi-
nite traces of memories, and for any trace T in T , there
exists an evaluation 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s1, M1〉 7−→ . . . 7−→
〈sn, Mn〉 such that T = [M,M1, . . . ,Mn]. Intuitively, ev-
ery trace in T is the outputs observable to users at some
point during the evaluation of 〈s, M〉, and T represents all
the outputs of 〈s, M〉 observable to users. Since the Aimp
language is deterministic, for any two traces in T , it must
be the case that one is a prefix of the other.
In the intuitive description of noninterference, equiva-
lent low-confidentiality inputs can be represented by two
memories whose low-confidentiality parts are indistinguish-
able. Suppose the typing information of a memory M is
given by a typing assignment Γ. Then m belongs to the
low-confidentiality part of M if C(Γ(m)) ≤ L, where
C(Γ(m)) denotes C(`) if Γ(m) is int`. Similarly, m is
a high-integrity reference if I(Γ(m)) 6≤ L, and a high-
availability reference if A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L. Let v1 ≈ v2 de-
note that v1 and v2 are indistinguishable. By the observation
model of Aimp, a user cannot distinguish none from any
other value. Consequently, v1 ≈ v2 if and only if v1 = v2,
v1 = none or v2 = none. With these settings, given two
memories M1 and M2 with respect to Γ, we define three
kinds of indistinguishability relations between M1 and M2
as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Γ ` M1 ≈C≤L M2). The low-
confidentiality parts of M1 and M2 are indistinguish-
able, written Γ ` M1 ≈C≤L M2, if for any m ∈ dom(Γ),
C(Γ(m)) ≤ L implies M1(m) ≈M2(m).
Definition 4.2 (Γ ` M1 ≈I 6≤L M2). The high-integrity
parts of M1 and M2 are indistinguishable, written Γ `
M1 ≈I 6≤L M2, if for any m ∈ dom(Γ), I(Γ(m)) 6≤ L im-
plies M1(m) ≈M2(m).
Definition 4.3 (Γ ` M1 ≈A 6≤L M2). The high-availability
parts of M1 and M2 are equally available, written Γ `
M1 ≈A 6≤L M2, if for any m ∈ dom(Γ), A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L
implies that M1(m) = none if and only if M2(m) = none.
Based on the definitions of memory indistinguishability,
we can define trace indistinguishability, which formalizes
the notion of equivalent outputs. First, we assume that users
cannot observe timing. As a result, traces [M,M ] and [M ]
look the same to a user. In general, two traces T1 and T2
are equivalent, written T1 ≈ T2, if they are equal up to
stuttering, which means the two traces obtained by elimi-
nating repeated elements in T1 and T2 are equal. For ex-
ample, [M1,M2,M2] ≈ [M1,M1,M2]. Second, T1 and T2
are indistinguishable, if T1 appears to be a prefix of T2, be-
cause in that case, T1 and T2 may be generated by the same
execution. Given two traces T1 and T2 of memories with
respect to Γ, let Γ ` T1 ≈C≤L T2 denote that the low-
confidentiality parts of T1 and T2 are indistinguishable, and
Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤L T2 denote that the high-integrity parts of
T1 and T2 are indistinguishable. These two notions are de-
fined as follows:
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Definition 4.4 (Γ ` T1 ≈C≤L T2). Given two traces T1 and
T2, Γ ` T1 ≈C≤L T2 if there exists T ′1 = [M1, . . . ,Mn]
and T ′2 = [M ′1, . . . ,M ′m] such that T1 ≈ T ′1, and T2 ≈ T ′2,
and Γ `Mi ≈C≤L M ′i for any i in {1, . . . , min(m,n)}.
Definition 4.5 (Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤L T2). Given two traces T1 and
T2, Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤L T2 if there exists T ′1 = [M1, . . . ,Mn]
and T ′2 = [M ′1, . . . ,M ′m] such that T1 ≈ T ′1, and T2 ≈ T ′2,
and Γ `Mi ≈I 6≤L M ′i for any i in {1, . . . , min(m,n)}.
Note that two executions are indistinguishable if any two
finite traces generated by those two executions are indis-
tinguishable. Thus, we can still reason about the indistin-
guishability of two nonterminating executions, even though
≈I 6≤L and ≈C≤L are defined on finite traces.
With the formal definitions of memory indistinguishabil-
ity and trace indistinguishability, it is straightforward to for-
malize confidentiality noninterference and integrity nonin-
terference:
Definition 4.6 (Confidentiality noninterference). A pro-
gram s has the confidentiality noninterference prop-
erty w.r.t. a typing assignment Γ, written Γ ` NIC(s),
if for any two traces T1 and T2 generated by evaluat-
ing 〈s, M1〉 and 〈s, M2〉, we have that Γ ` M1 ≈C≤L M2
implies Γ ` T1 ≈C≤L T2.
Note that this confidentiality noninterference property
does not treat covert channels based on termination and
timing. Static control of timing channels is largely orthog-
onal to this work, and has been partially addressed else-
where [28, 2, 23].
Definition 4.7 (Integrity noninterference). A program s
has the integrity noninterference property w.r.t. a typing as-
signment Γ, written Γ ` NII(s), if for any two traces T1
and T2 generated by evaluating 〈s, M1〉 and 〈s, M2〉, we
have that Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤L M2 implies Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤L T2.
Consider the intuitive description of availability non-
interference. To formalize the notion that all the high-
availability inputs are available, we first need to distinguish
input references from unassigned output references. Given
a program s, let R denote the set of unassigned output ref-
erences. In general, references in R are mapped to none
in the initial memory. If m 6∈ R, then reference m repre-
sents either an input, or an output that is already been gen-
erated. Thus, given an initial memory M , the notion that all
the high-availability inputs are available can be represented
by ∀m. (A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L∧m 6∈ R)⇒M(m) 6= none, as in
the following definition of availability noninterference:
Definition 4.8 (Availability noninterference). A program
s has the availability noninterference property w.r.t. a typ-
ing assignment Γ and a set of unassigned output refer-
ences R, written Γ ;R ` NIA(s), if for any two memo-
ries M1,M2, the following statements
• Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤L M2
• For i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀m ∈ dom(Γ). A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L ∧m 6∈
R ⇒Mi(m) 6= none
• 〈s, Mi〉 7−→∗ 〈s′i, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}
imply that there exist 〈s′′i , M ′′i 〉 for i ∈ {1, 2} such that
〈s′i, M ′i〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′i , M ′′i 〉 and Γ `M ′′1 ≈A 6≤L M ′′2 .
5. Security typing and soundness
The type system of Aimp is designed to ensure that
any well-typed Aimp program satisfies the noninterference
properties defined in Section 4. For confidentiality and in-
tegrity, the type system performs a standard static informa-
tion flow analysis [7, 30]. For availability, the type system
tracks the set of unassigned output references and uses them
to ensure that availability requirements are not violated.
To track unassigned output references, the typing envi-
ronment for a statement s includes a component R, which
contains the set of unassigned output references before the
execution of s. The typing judgment for statements has the
form: Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR′ , where Γ is the typing assign-
ment, and pc is the program counter label [6] used to track
security levels of the program counter. The typing judgment
for expressions has the form Γ ;R ` e : τ
The typing rules are shown in Figure 5. Rules (INT) and
(NONE) check constants. An integer n has type int` where
` can be an arbitrary label. The value none represents an un-
available value, so it can have any data type. Since int is
the only data type in Aimp, none has type int`.
Rule (REF) says that the type of a reference m is τ ref
if Γ(m) = τ . In Aimp, a memory maps references to val-
ues, and values always have integer types.
Rule (DEREF) checks dereference expressions. It disal-
lows dereferencing the references in R, because they are
unassigned output references.
Rule (ADD) checks addition expressions. Let `1 unionsq `2 be
〈C(`1)unionsqC(`2), I(`1)uI(`2), A(`1)uA(`2)〉. As discussed
in Section 2.8, the label of e1 + e2 is exactly `1 unionsq `2 if ei
has the label `i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Rule (SEQ) checks sequential statements. The premise
Γ ;R ; pc ` s1 : stmtR1 means that R1 is the set of
unassigned output references after s1 terminates and be-
fore s2 starts. Therefore, the typing environment for s2 is
Γ ;R1 ; pc. It is clear that s2 and s1; s2 terminate at the same
point. Thus, s1; s2 has the same type as s2.
Rule (ASSIGN) checks assignment statements. The
statement m := e assigns the value of e to m, creat-
ing an explicit information flow from e to m and an implicit
flow from the program counter to m. To control these infor-
mation flows, this rule requires C(`′) unionsq C(pc) ≤ C(Γ(m))
to protect the confidentiality of e and the program counter,
and I(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc)uC(`′) to protect the integrity of m.
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[INT ] Γ ;R ` n : int`
[NONE ] Γ ;R ` none : int`
[REF ] Γ(m) = int`
Γ ;R ` m : int` ref
[DEREF ] m 6∈ R Γ(m) = int`
Γ ;R `!m : int`
[ADD ] Γ ;R ` e1 : int`1 Γ ;R ` e2 : int`2
Γ ;R ` e1 + e2 : int`1unionsq`2
[SKIP] Γ ;R ; pc ` skip : stmtR
[SEQ ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` s1 : stmtR1
Γ ;R1 ; pc ` s2 : stmtR2
Γ ;R ; pc ` s1; s2 : stmtR2
[ASSIGN ]
Γ ;R ` m : int` ref Γ ;R ` e : int`′
C(pc) unionsq C(`′) ≤ C(`) I(`) ≤ I(pc) u I(`′)
AΓ(R) ≤ A(`′)
Γ ;R ; pc ` m := e : stmtR−{m}
[IF ]
Γ ;R ` e : int` AΓ(R) ≤ A(`)
Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` si : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ;R ; pc ` if e then s1 else s2 : τ
[WHILE ]
Γ ` e : int` Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` s : stmtR
AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) u I(pc) uA(`)
Γ ;R ; pc ` while e do s : stmtR
[SUB ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ Γ ;R ; pc ` τ ≤ τ ′
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ ′
Figure 4. Typing rules for Aimp
If the value of e is unavailable, the assignment m := e
will get stuck. Therefore, rule (ASSIGN) has the premise
AΓ(R) ≤ A(`′), where AΓ(R) =
⊔
m∈RA(Γ(m)), to
ensure the availability of e is as high as the availability
of any unassigned output reference. For example, in the
code segment (A) of Figure 3, the type system ensures that
A(Γ(mo)) ≤ A(Γ(m1)).
Finally, when the assignment m := e terminates, m
should be removed from the set of unassigned output ref-
erences, and thus the statement has type stmtR−{m}.
Rule (IF) checks if statements. Consider the state-
ment if e then s1 else s2. The value of e determines
which branch is executed, so the program-counter la-
bels for branches s1 and s2 subsume the label of e to pro-
tect e from implicit flows. As usual, the if statement has
type τ if both s1 and s2 have type τ . As in rule (AS-
SIGN), the premise AΓ(R) ≤ A(`) ensures that e has
sufficient availability.
Rule (WHILE) checks while statements. In this rule,
the premise AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) u I(pc) u A(`) can be decom-
posed into three constraints: AΓ(R) ≤ A(`), which ensures
that e has sufficient availability, AΓ(R) ≤ I(`), which pre-
vents attackers from making the while statement diverge
by compromising the integrity of e, and AΓ(R) ≤ I(pc),
which guarantees the integrity of the control flow reaching
the while statement, because a while statement may di-
verge without any interaction with attackers.
For example, consider the code segments (B) and (C) in
Figure 3, in which R = {mo}. Suppose A(Γ(mo)) 6≤ L.
In (B), the constraint AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) of rule (WHILE) en-
sures I(Γ(m1)) 6≤ L, so attackers cannot affect the value of
m1, and whether the while statement diverges. In (C), the
constraint AΓ(R) ≤ I(pc) guarantees I(pc) 6≤ L, and thus
I(Γ(m1)) 6≤ L holds because I(pc) ≤ I(Γ(m1)). There-
fore, attackers cannot affect which branch of the if state-
ment would be taken, or whether control reaches the while
statement.
Rule (SUB) is the standard subsumption rule. Let
Γ ;R ; pc ` τ ≤ τ ′ denote that τ is a subtype of τ ′ with re-
spect to the typing environment Γ ;R ; pc. The type system
of Aimp has one subtyping rule:
[ST ]
R′ ⊆ R′′ ⊆ R
∀m, m ∈ R′′ −R′ ⇒ A(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc)
Γ ;R ; pc ` stmtR′ ≤ stmtR′′
Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` stmtR′ ≤ stmtR′′ and Γ ;R ; pc `
s : stmtR′ . Then Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR′′ by rule (SUB).
In other words, if R′ contains all the unassigned output ref-
erences after s terminates, so does R′′. This is guaranteed
by the premise R′ ⊆ R′′ of rule (ST). The reference set R
contains all the unassigned output references before s is ex-
ecuted, so rule (ST) requires R′′ ⊆ R. Intuitively, that the
statement s can be treated as having type stmtR′′ is be-
cause there exists another control flow path that bypasses s
and does not assign to references inR′′−R′. Consequently,
for any m in R′′ − R′, the availability of m may depend
on whether s is executed. Therefore, rule (ST) enforces the
constraint ∀m, m ∈ R′′ −R′ ⇒ A(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc).
Consider the assignment mo := 1 in code segment (D)
of Figure 3. By rule (ASSIGN), Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` mo :=
0 : stmt∅. For the else branch of the if statement,
we have Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` skip : stmt{mo}. By rule (IF),
Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` mo := 0 : stmt{mo} needs to hold, which
requires Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` stmt∅ ≤ stmt{mo}. In this ex-
ample, the availability of mo depends on which branch is
taken, and we need to ensure A(Γ(mo)) ≤ I(Γ(m1)). In-
deed, if (D) is well typed, by rules (ST) and (IF), we have
A(Γ(mo)) ≤ I(pc) ≤ I(Γ(m1)).
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This type system satisfies the subject reduction prop-
erty. Moreover, we can prove that any well-typed program
has confidentiality, integrity and availability noninterfer-
ence properties. The proofs of the following two theorems
are included in Appendix A.
Theorem 5.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc `
s : τ , and dom(Γ) = dom(M). If 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉,
then there exists R′ such that Γ ;R′ ; pc ` s′ : τ , and
R′ ⊆ R, and for any m ∈ R−R′, M ′(m) 6= none.
Theorem 5.2 (Noninterference). If Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ , then
Γ ` NIC(s), Γ ` NII(s) and Γ ;R ` NIA(s).
6. Extensions
This section describes two language extensions that can
be used to reduce availability dependencies and allow a pro-
gram to use low-availability data in a more flexible and
practical way.
6.1. Timeout
Timeouts can effectively turn a blocking operation into a
non-blocking operation, and thus provide a strong availabil-
ity guarantee for a computation that uses low-availability in-
puts. To support timeouts, we introduce two syntax exten-
sions to Aimp: timed integer values and a race expression.
Values v ::= . . . | 〈n, t〉
Expressions e ::= . . . | e1#e2
A timed integer 〈n, t〉 is similar to integer n except that
it would take t units of time to use this value. A race expres-
sion e1#e2 evaluates e1 and e2 at the same time and returns
the result of the expression that finishes first. If both e1 and
e2 finish at the same time, the result of e1 would be the fi-
nal result. Suppose we want to set a timeout t for expres-
sion e so that if the evaluation of e does not finish in t units
of time, a default value n is returned as the result of e. This
can be implemented by the expression e#〈n, t〉.
Using the timeout mechanism, the following program
implements an auction for two clients Alice and Bob. Ref-
erence mA represents Alice’s bid, and Alice has 30 units
of time to make a bid, otherwise time runs out, and 0 is re-
turned as her bid. Similarly, Bob also has 30 units of time
to make a bid. Even though the result of this auction de-
pends on the bids of Alice and Bob, the availability of the
auction result is not affected by them.
m1 := !mA#〈0, 30〉;
m2 := !mB#〈0, 30〉;
if (!m1 ≥ !m2) mo := !m1
else mo := !m2
6.1.1. Operational semantics. Note that value n can be
treated as a syntax sugar for 〈n, 0〉. As a result, the eval-
uation rules in Figure 2 can be adapted to the timeout ex-
tension by replacing any occurrence of 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n with
a more general form 〈e, M〉 ⇓ 〈n, t〉. For example, the
adapted rule (S1) is shown below:
[S1 ] 〈e, M〉 ⇓ 〈n, t〉〈m := e, M〉 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→ n]〉
In addition, the formula for computing v1 + v2 in rule (E2)
also needs to be adapted to this more general form of val-
ues:
v1+v2 =
{
〈n1 + n2, t1 + t2〉 if ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. vi = 〈ni, ti〉
none if v1 = none or v2 = none
The operational semantics of the race expression is given by
the following rules (E3)–(E5). Suppose e1 and e2 are eval-
uated to 〈n1, t1〉 and 〈n2, t2〉, which means evaluating e1
and e2 takes t1 and t2 units of time, respectively. Thus, if
t1 ≤ t2 (E3), the result of e1 should be the final result, and
if t1 > t2 (E4), 〈n2, t2〉 is the final result. Rule (E5) ap-
plies when only the result of one expression ei is available.
[E3 ] 〈e1, M〉 ⇓ 〈n1, t1〉 〈e2, M〉 ⇓ 〈n2, t2〉 t1 ≤ t2〈e1#e2, M〉 ⇓ 〈n1, t1〉
[E4 ] 〈e1, M〉 ⇓ 〈n1, t1〉 〈e2, M〉 ⇓ 〈n2, t2〉 t1 > t2〈e1#e2, M〉 ⇓ 〈n2, t2〉
[E5 ] 〈ei, M〉 ⇓ 〈n, t〉 〈ej , M〉 ⇓ none {i, j} = {1, 2}〈e1#e2, M〉 ⇓ 〈n, t〉
6.1.2. Typing. The race expression is essential for the
timeout mechanism to provide strong availability guaran-
tees. Consider a race expression e1#e2. According to rule
(E5), the result of expression e1#e2 is available as long
as the result of e1 or e2 is available. Therefore, the avail-
ability of e is as high as the availability of e1 and e2. Let
A(e) represent the availability label of e. Then we have
A(e1#e2) = A(e1)unionsqA(e2). On the other hand, the value of
e1#e2 depends on the availability and timing of both e1 and
e2. Consequently, an attacker can try to compromise the in-
tegrity of e1#e2 by compromising the availability or timing
of e1 or e2. Intuitively, the race expression trades integrity
for availability.
To take into account attacks on timing, a security label
may contain a new base label component βIT (IT stands for
integrity of timing), and IT (`) is used to retrieve the com-
ponent in `. Suppose expression e has a label `, and the re-
sult of e is 〈n, t〉. Then an attacker with a security level L
can affect the value of t if and only if IT (`) ≤ L.
Suppose e1 and e2 have type int`1 and int`2 , respec-
tively. Then e1#e2 has type int`1#`2 , where `1#`2 is a la-
bel computed from `1 and `2. Based on the above discus-
sion, we have:
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A(`1#`2) =A(`1) unionsqA(`2)
I(`1#`2) = I(`1) u I(`2) uA(`1) uA(`2) u IT (`1) u IT (`2)
By rule (E5), if the result of e1#e2 is 〈n, t〉, the value of t
may be affected by the availability of e1 and e2. Therefore,
IT (`1#`2) = IT (`1) u IT (`2) uA(`1) uA(`2)
As usual, C(`1#`2) = C(`1) unionsq C(`2), since the result of
e1#e2 depends on the results of both e1 and e2. With these
formulas for computing `1#`2, the typing rule for checking
the race expression is straightforward:
[RACE ] Γ ;R ` e1 : int`1 Γ ;R ` e2 : int`2
Γ ;R ` e1#e2 : int`1#`2
Because the timeout mechanism trades integrity for
availability and allows attackers to compromise the in-
tegrity of an output by affecting the availability or
timing of an input, the definition of integrity noninter-
ference needs to be adapted to these new risks. Intu-
itively, the adapted integrity noninterference would re-
quire two sets of inputs M1 and M2 to generate equivalent
high-integrity outputs, if the high-integrity parts, the avail-
ability of the high-availability parts and the timing of the
high-integrity-of-timing parts of M1 and M2 are indistin-
guishable. The formal definition is given below, following
the definition of the memory indistinguishability with re-
spect to the integrity of timing:
Definition 6.1 (Γ ` M1 ≈IT 6≤L M2). Suppose dom(Γ) =
dom(M1) = dom(M2). Then Γ ` M1 ≈IT 6≤L M2 means
that for any m ∈ dom(Γ), IT (Γ(m)) 6≤ L and M1(m) =
〈n1, t1〉 and M2(m) = 〈n1, t2〉 imply t1 = t2.
Definition 6.2 (Integrity noninterference). A program s
has the integrity noninterference property w.r.t. a typing as-
signment Γ, written Γ ` NII(s), if for any two traces T1
and T2 generated by evaluating 〈s, M1〉 and 〈s, M2〉, we
have that Γ ` M1 ≈I 6≤L M2, Γ ` M1 ≈A 6≤L M2 and
Γ `M1 ≈IT 6≤L M2 imply Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤L T2.
6.2. Run-time reference generation
For a program s in Aimp, the set of outputs that s is ex-
pected to generate are statically determined by a set of refer-
ences R. However, in some realistic applications, an output
may be expected only after control reaches certain program
points. For example, consider a simple service that responds
to the request from a client. The response is expected only
after the service receives a client request. To express such
kind of availability requirements, we extend Aimp with a
new statement that creates a new reference in memory. Intu-
itively, the output represented by this reference is expected
by users only after the point where it is created. The syn-
tax of this extension is shown below:
References r ::= m | x
Expressions e ::= . . . | !r
Statements s ::= . . . | r := e
| new x :`x = ref(`) in s
The name x is used to range over a set of reference vari-
ables. The new statement new x : `x = ref(`) in s creates
a new reference m with type int` ref, substitutes the oc-
currences of x in s with m, and then executes s. Now a ref-
erence r may be a memory location m or a variable x. Ac-
cordingly, the dereference expression and the assignment
statement have the form !r and r := e, respectively.
Because the memory is observable to users, the creation
of a new reference is an observable event and may be used
as an information channel. In a new statement new x : `x =
ref(`)in s, the label `x is used to specify the security level
of this event and control this new kind of implicit flows. For
example, any user with a confidentiality level not as high as
C(`x) should not observe the creation of the reference.
Consider the simple service example. In Aimp, a
straightforward implementation is shown below:
m := !m1;
m2 := 1;
where m1 represents the client request, and m2 repre-
sents the output generated by the server in response to
the client request. This implementation is problematic be-
cause the availability of m2 depends on that of m1. In prac-
tice, we can imagine that the availability labels of m1 and
m2 are {*:client} and {*:server}, respectively, where
client represents the client machine, and server repre-
sents the server machine. However, in general, client does
not act for server, and thus {*:server} 6≤ {*:client}.
Therefore, the above program is not well-typed in practice.
With the new statement, the simple service can be im-
plemented by the following program in which the server re-
sponse is represented by a reference variable x instead of
a memory location. Since x is created after m1 is derefer-
enced, the availability of x does not depend on that of m1.
m := !m1;
new x:`x = ref(〈βC, βI, {*:server}〉) in
x := 1;
6.2.1. Operational semantics. Formally, the follow-
ing rule is used to evaluate the new statement:
[S7 ] m = newloc(M, `x)〈new x :`x = ref(`) in s, M〉 7−→
〈s[m/x], M [m 7→ none]〉
The function newloc(M, `x) deterministically returns a
fresh reference m such that m 6∈ dom(M). The observabil-
ity and integrity of the newly created reference are specified
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by a label `x. To associate a memory reference with its la-
bel, we assume there exists a map Ω from the memory space
M (an infinite set of memory locations) to labels. Given
a label `, let M` = {m | m ∈ M ∧ Ω(m) = `}. In ad-
dition, we assume that for any `, M` is infinite. The
function newloc(M, `x) deterministically picks a refer-
ence m from M`x such that m 6∈ dom(M).
The definitions of memory indistinguishability need to
take into account the reference labels, which determine
the observability and integrity of references themselves.
We give the new definition for Γ ` M1 ≈A 6≤L M2 be-
low. Compared to Definition 4.3, this definition does not
require dom(M1) = dom(M2), but I(Ω(m)) 6≤ L im-
plies m ∈ dom(M1) ∩ dom(M2). The new definitions for
Γ ` M1 ≈I 6≤L M2 and Γ ` M1 ≈C≤L M2 have simi-
lar adjustments.
Definition 6.3 (Γ ` M1 ≈A 6≤L M2). Suppose dom(Γ) =
dom(M1) ∪ dom(M2). Then Γ ` M1 ≈A 6≤L M2 if for
any m ∈ dom(Γ) such that I(Ω(m)) 6≤ L, we have
m ∈ dom(M1) ∩ dom(M2), and A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L implies
that M1(m) = none if and only if M2(m) = none.
Note that we assume that for any reference m in the ini-
tial memory of a program, Ω(m) = 〈⊥C ,>I ,>A〉. As a
result, if a program s does not contain any new statement,
these new definitions of memory indistinguishability , when
applied to the traces of s, are consistent with those original
definitions in Section 3.
6.2.2. Typing. The type system of Aimp needs to be ex-
tended to manipulate reference variables and check the new
statement. First, variable x represents a reference that can
be used in the typing environment: the typing assignment
Γ may map x to a type, and the reference set R may con-
tain x. For example, consider the statement new x : `x =
ref(`) in s. Suppose the typing environment for the new
statement is “Γ ;R ; pc”. Then the typing environment for s
should be “Γ, x : int` ;R ∪ {x} ; pc”. Second, to control
the implicit information flow arising from the creation of a
new reference, the typing rule for checking the statement
new x : `x = ref(`) in s needs to ensure that the confiden-
tiality and integrity components of `x are bounded by the
current program counter label pc. Formally, the correspond-
ing constraints are C(pc) ≤ C(`x) and I(`x) ≤ I(pc).
Intuitively, the value or availability of a reference cre-
ated at a program point is not affected by whether control
reaches this point, because the reference itself does not ex-
ist if control does not reach the point. As a result, the typ-
ing rules in Figure 5 may be over-restrictive for reasoning
about the security policies of a reference created at run time.
For example, consider the following code:
if (!m) then
new x:`x = ref(`) in
while !m1 do m1 := m1 - 1;
x := 1
else
skip
Suppose Γ ;R ; pc is the typing environment for the while
statement in the above code. Then I(pc) ≤ I(Γ(m)) holds
by the typing rule (IF). Furthermore, we have x ∈ R, which
requires A(`) ≤ I(pc) by rule (WHILE). Therefore, for the
above code to be well-typed, A(`) ≤ I(Γ(m)) needs to
hold, which contradicts the intuition that the availability of
x is not affected by whether control reaches the new state-
ment. To increase the precision of the static security analy-
sis, we extend the type system to track the program counter
label for each reference variable x from the program point
where x is created. Accordingly, the typing environment is
extended with a new component ∆ that maps references to
program count labels.
The typing rule (NEW) is used to check the new state-
ment new x : `x = ref(`) in s. In this rule, statement s
is checked with variable x in scope. In the typing environ-
ment of s, the program counter label mapped to x is ⊥pc,
which is {⊥C ,>I ,>A}.
[NEW ]
Γ, x :int` ;R∪ {x} ;∆, x :⊥pc ; pc ` s : τ
C(pc) ≤ C(`x) I(`x) ≤ I(pc)
Γ ;R ;∆ ; pc ` new x :`x = ref(`) in s : τ
In addition, typing rules (ASSIGN), (IF) and (WHILE)
need to take into account the ∆ component in the typing en-
vironment. To abuse the notation a bit, we use ∆ unionsq ` to de-
note the program counter map ∆′ that satisfies dom(∆) =
dom(∆′) and ∆′(r) = ∆(r)unionsq` for any r ∈ dom(∆). In ad-
dition, let ∆(r, pc) denote ∆(r) if r ∈ dom(∆), and pc if
otherwise. The adjusted typing rules are shown as follows:
[ASSIGN ]
Γ ;R ` r : int` ref Γ ;R ` e : int`′
C(∆(r, pc)) unionsq C(`′) ≤ C(`)
I(`) ≤ I(∆(r, pc)) u I(`′) AΓ(R) ≤ A(`′)
Γ ;R ;∆ ; pc ` r := e : stmtR−{r}
[IF ]
Γ ;R ` e : int` AΓ(R) ≤ A(`)
Γ ;R ;∆ unionsq ` ; pc unionsq ` ` si : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ;R ;∆ ; pc ` if e then s1 else s2 : τ
[WHILE ]
Γ ` e : int` AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) uA(`)
Γ ;R ;∆ unionsq ` ; pc unionsq ` ` s : stmtR
∀r ∈ R, A(r) ≤ I(∆(r, pc))
Γ ;R ;∆ ; pc ` while e do s : stmtR
6.2.3. Example: TCP handshake protocol. The TCP
connection establishment process uses a three-step hand-
shake protocol [26]. First, a client host hc sends a SYN(h)
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packet that contains the address of host h to a server s. Sec-
ond, the server sends a SYN ACK packet to host h. Third,
host h sends an ACK or RST packet to the server, depend-
ing on whether h is hc. An instance of this protocol can be
simulated by the following code, in which message com-
munications are modeled by assignments:
m := !mi,hc; // receive SYN from hc
new xend:〈⊥,⊥,>〉 = ref(〈s :s, s :s, s :hc〉) in
mo,h := !m + 1; // send SYN_ACK to h
m := !mi,h; // receive ACK/RST from h
xend := 1
The reference mi,hc represents the connection request from
hc. After the request is received, a new reference xend is
created to capture the availability requirement of the server:
the protocol will terminate if the client hc does not fail,
which is specified by the availability label s :hc of xend.
The statement m := mi,h represents the third step of the
handshake protocol, and the reference mi,h represents the
response from h. Intuitively, the availability of mi,h only
depends on h, and thus we suppose that the availability la-
bel of mi,h is s : h. Then the above code is not well-typed
because s : hc 6≤ s : h. Interestingly, this reflects the prob-
lem with the handshake protocol that allows the SYN flood-
ing attack: host h may be spoofed and cannot be trusted to
establish the connection between s and hc.
7. Related work
There has been much research on ensuring high avail-
ability of a computer platform, or guaranteeing a server to
carry out the computation requests from clients. Most of
these work falls in two main categories: one is aimed at
tolerating server-side failures, usually by using some repli-
cation techniques [25, 17, 4]; the other deals with faulty
clients and defends denial of service attacks [31, 19, 13].
This work is concerned with the availability risks inherent
to the computation that may process untrusted inputs, while
the computation platform is assumed available.
Lamport first introduced the concepts of safety and live-
ness properties [15]. Being available is often characterized
as a liveness property, which informally means “something
good will eventually happen”. In general, verifying whether
a program will eventually produce an output is equivalent
to solving the halting problem, and thus incomputable for a
Turing-complete language. In this work, we propose a secu-
rity model in which an availability policy can be enforced
by a noninterference property [9]. It is well known that a
noninterference property is not a property on traces [18],
and unlike safety or liveness properties, cannot be specified
by a trace set. However, a noninterference property can be
treated as a property on pairs of traces. For example, con-
sider a trace pair 〈T1, T2〉. It has the confidentiality nonin-
terference property if the first elements of T1 and T2 are
distinguishable, or T1 and T2 are indistinguishable to low-
confidentiality users. Therefore, a noninterference property
can be represented by a set of trace pairs S, and a program
satisfies the property if all the pairs of traces produced by
the program belong to S. Interestingly, with respect to a
trace pair, the confidentiality and integrity noninterference
properties have the informal meaning of safety properties
(“something bad will not happen”), and availability nonin-
terference takes on the informal meaning of liveness.
Focardi and Gorrieri [8] provide a classification of secu-
rity properties in the setting of a non-deterministic process
algebra. In particular, the BNDC (bisimulation-based non-
deducibility on compositions) property prevents attackers
from affecting the availabilities of observable process ac-
tions. However, the BNDC property requires observational
equivalence, making it difficult to separate the concerns for
integrity and availability.
Yu and Gligor [31] develop a formal method for ana-
lyzing availability: a form of first-order temporal logic is
used to specify safety and liveness constraints on the inputs
and behaviors of a service, and then those constraints can be
used to formally verify the availability guarantees of the ser-
vice. The flexibility and expressiveness of first-order tem-
poral logic come at a price: it is difficult to automatize the
verification process. The approach of formalizing and rea-
soning system constraints and guarantees in terms of logic
resembles the rely-guarantee method [12], which was also
applied to analyzing cryptographic protocols by Guttman et
al. [10].
Lafrance and Mullins [14] define a semantic security
property impassivity for preventing DoS attacks. Intuitively,
impassivity means that low-cost actions cannot interfere
with high-cost actions. In some sense, impassivity is an in-
tegrity noninterference property, if we treat low-cost as low-
integrity and high-cost as high-integrity. With the implicit
assumption that high-cost actions may exhaust system re-
sources and render a system unavailable, impassivity corre-
sponds to one part of our notion of availability noninterfer-
ence: low-integrity inputs cannot affect the availabilities of
highly available outputs.
Li et al. [16] formalize the notion that highly available
data does not depend on low-availability data. However,
their definition is termination-insensitive [24], which makes
it inappropriate to model availability noninterference.
Volpano and Smith [29] introduce the notion of termi-
nation agreement, which requires two executions indistin-
guishable to low-confidentiality users to both terminate or
both diverge. The integrity dual of termination agreement
can be viewed as a special case of the availability noninter-
ference in which termination is treated as the only output of
a program.
Language-based information flow control techniques [7,
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24, 30, 11, 32, 22, 3, 33] can be used to enforce nonin-
terference. But they mainly dealt with confidentiality and
integrity. Our work focuses on applying the security-typed
language approach to enforcing availability policies.
Myers and Liskov proposed the decentralized la-
bel model for specifying information flow policies [20].
This paper generalizes the DLM to provide a unified frame-
work for specifying confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity policies. The form of a combined security policy is an
instance of an owned policy [5], though we give a differ-
ent semantics here.
8. Conclusions
This paper makes three contributions. First, it proposes
a way to specify availability policies as an extension to the
decentralized label model, including the added expressive
power of conjunctive and disjunctive principals and a new
semantics for policies and labels. Second, the paper presents
a simple language that can explicitly specify security poli-
cies as type annotations and has a security type system to
reason about end-to-end availability policies, along with
confidentiality and integrity policies. Third, the paper for-
mally defines an end-to-end availability property in terms
of program traces and shows that the security type system
enforces this property. As far as we know, this is the first se-
curity type system for reasoning about availability.
An important direction for future work is to apply this
static availability analysis framework to multithreaded pro-
gramming models, and develop a notion of possibilistic (or
probabilistic) availability noninterference.
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A. Noninterference proof
The noninterference result for Aimp is proved by extend-
ing the language to a new language AimpX. Each configu-
ration C in AimpX encodes two Aimp configurations C1
and C2. Moreover, the operational semantics of AimpX is
consistent with that of Aimp in the sense that the result of
evaluating C is an encoding of the results of evaluating C1
and C2 in Aimp. The type system of AimpX can guaran-
tee that C is well-typed only if the low-confidentiality or
high-integrity parts of C1 and C2 are equivalent. Intuitively,
if the result of C is well-typed, then the results of evaluating
C1 and C2 should also have equivalent low-confidentiality
or high-integrity parts. Therefore, the preservation of type
soundness in an AimpX evaluation implies the preserva-
tion of low-confidentiality or high-integrity equivalence be-
tween two Aimp evaluations. Thus, to prove the confiden-
tiality and integrity noninterference theorems of Aimp, we
only need to prove the subject reduction theorem of AimpX.
This proof technique was first used by Pottier and Simonet
to prove the noninterference result of a security-typed ML-
like language [22].
Interestingly, the availability noninterference theorem of
Aimp can by proved by a progress property of AimpX’s
type system. This appendix details the syntax and seman-
tic extensions of AimpX, proves the key subject reduction
and progress theorems of AimpX, and then proves the non-
interference theorem of Aimp.
A.1. Syntax extensions
The syntax extensions of AimpX include the bracket
constructs, which are composed of two Aimp terms and
used to capture the differences between two Aimp configu-
rations.
Values v ::= . . . | (v1 | v2)
Expressions e ::= . . . | (n1 | n2)
Statements s ::= . . . | (s1 | s2)
The bracket constructs cannot be nested, so the subterms of
a bracket construct must be Aimp terms. Given an AimpX
statement s, let bsc1 and bsc2 represent the two Aimp
statements that s encodes. The projection functions satisfy
b(s1 | s2)ci = si and are homomorphisms on other state-
ment and expression forms. An AimpX memory M maps
references to AimpX values that encode two Aimp values.
Thus, the projection function can be defined on memories
too. For i ∈ {1, 2}, dom(bMci) = dom(M), and for any
m ∈ dom(M), bMci(m) = bM(m)ci.
Since an AimpX term effectively encodes two Aimp
terms, the evaluation of a AimpX term can be projected into
two Aimp evaluations. An evaluation step of a bracket state-
ment (s1 | s2) is an evaluation step of either s1 or s2, and
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s1 or s2 can only access the corresponding projection of the
memory. Thus, the configuration of AimpX has an index
i ∈ {•, 1, 2} that indicates whether the term to be evaluated
is a subterm of a bracket expression, and if so, which branch
of a bracket the term belongs to. For example, the configu-
ration 〈s, M〉1 means that s belongs to the first branch of a
bracket, and s can only access the first projection of M . We
write “〈s, M〉” for “〈s, M〉•”, which means s does not be-
long to any bracket.
The operational semantics of AimpX is shown in Fig-
ure 5. It is based on the semantics of Aimp and con-
tains some new evaluation rules (S10–S12) for manipulat-
ing bracket constructs. Rules (E1) and (S1) are modified to
access the memory projection corresponding to index i. The
rest of the rules in Figure 2 are adapted to AimpX by index-
ing each configuration with i. The following adequacy and
soundness lemmas state that the operational semantics of
AimpX is adequate to encode the execution of two Aimp
terms.
Let the notation 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s′, M ′〉 denote that
〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s1, M1〉 7−→ . . . 7−→ 〈sn, Mn〉 7−→
〈s′, M ′〉 and T = [M,M1, . . . ,Mn,M ′], or s = s′ and
M = M ′ and T = [M ]. In addition, let |T | denote the
length of T , and T1 ⊕ T2 denote the trace obtained by
concatenating T1 and T2. Suppose T1 = [M1, . . . ,Mn]
and T2 = [M ′1, . . . ,M ′m]. If memn = M ′1, then T1 ⊕
T2 = [M1, . . . ,Mn,M ′2, . . . ,M
′
m]. Otherwise, T1 ⊕ T2 =
[M1, . . . ,Mn,M ′1, . . . ,M
′
m].
Lemma A.1 (Projection i). Suppose 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. Then
〈beci, bMci〉 ⇓ bvci holds for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Lemma A.2 (Projection ii). Suppose M is an AimpX
memory, and bMci = Mi for i ∈ {1, 2}, and 〈s, Mi〉 is
an Aimp configuration. Then 〈s, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′i〉 if and
only if 〈s, M〉i 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉i and bM ′ci = M ′i .
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
Lemma A.3 (One-step adequacy). If for i ∈ {1, 2},
〈si, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s′i, M ′i〉 is an evaluation in Aimp, and there
exists 〈s, M〉 in AimpX such that bsci = si and bMci =
Mi, then there exists 〈s′, M ′〉 such that 〈s, M〉 7−→T
〈s′, M ′〉, and one of the following statements holds:
i. For i ∈ {1, 2}, bT ci ≈ [Mi,M ′i ] and bs′ci = s′i.
ii. For {j, k} = {1, 2}, bT cj ≈ [Mj ] and bs′cj = sj , and
bT ck ≈ [Mk,M ′k] and bs′ck = s′k.
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
• s is skip. Then s1 and s2 are also skip and cannot
be further evaluated. Therefore, the lemma is correct
because its premise does not hold.
[E1 ] pii M(m) = v v 6= none〈!m, M〉i ⇓ v
[E2 ] 〈e1, M〉i ⇓ v1 〈e2, M〉i ⇓ v2 v = v1 ⊕ v2〈e1 + e2, M〉 ⇓ v
[S1 ] 〈e, M〉i ⇓ v bvc1 6= none bvc2 6= none〈m := e, M〉i 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→M(x)[v/pii]]〉i
[S10 ] 〈e, M〉 ⇓ (n1 | n2)〈if e then s1 else s2, M〉 7−→
〈(if n1 then bs1c1 else bs2c1 |
if n2 then bs1c2 else bs2c2),M〉
[S11 ]
〈si, M〉i 7−→ 〈s′i, M ′〉i sj = s′j {i, j} = {1, 2}
〈(s1 | s2), M〉 7−→ 〈(s′1 | s′2), M ′〉
[S12] 〈(skip | skip), M〉 7−→ 〈skip, M〉
[Auxiliary functions]
v[v′/pi•] = v′ pi• v = v
v[v′/pi1] = (v′ | bvc2) pi1 v = bvc1
v[v′/pi2] = (bvc1 | v′) pi2 v = bvc2
Figure 5. The operational semantics of AimpX
• s is m := e. In this case, si is m := beci, and
〈m := beci, M1〉 7−→ 〈skip, Mi[m 7→ vi]〉 where
〈beci, M1〉 ⇓ vi. By induction, we have 〈e, M〉 ⇓
v and bvci = vi. Therefore, 〈m := e, M〉 7−→
〈skip, M [m 7→ v]〉. Since bMci = Mi, we have
bM [m 7→ v]ci = Mi[m 7→ bvci]. Finally, we have
bs′ci = s′i = skip for i ∈ {1, 2}.
• s is if e then s′′1 else s′′2 . Suppose 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n. Then
〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′′j , M〉 for some j in {1, 2}, and si is
if e then bs′′1ci else bs′′2ci for i ∈ {1, 2}. There-
fore, 〈si, bMci〉 7−→ 〈bs′′j ci, bMci〉 holds because
〈e, bMci〉 ⇓ n. It is clear that for i ∈ {1, 2}, bT ci =
[bMci, bMci] = [Mi,Mi] and bs′ci = bs′′j ci = s′i.
Suppose 〈e, M〉 ⇓ (n1 | n2). Then 〈s, M〉 7−→T
〈(bs′′j1c1 | bs′′j2c2), M〉 where j1, j2 ∈ {1, 2}. Because〈e, M〉 ⇓ (n1 | n2), we have 〈beci, bMci〉 ⇓ ni for
i ∈ {1, 2}, which implies 〈si, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s′′ji , Mi〉 for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, bT ci ≈ bMci ≈ [Mi,Mi] and
bsci = s′i = bs′′jici hold for i ∈ {1, 2}.
• s is while e do s′′. Then 〈s, M〉 7−→∗
〈if e then s; while e do s′′ else skip, M〉. Further-
more, 〈si, bMci〉 7−→∗
〈if becithenbsci; whilebecidobs′′cielseskip, bMci〉
for i ∈ {1, 2}. It is clear that bT ci = [bMci, bMci]
and bs′ci = s′i hold for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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• s is s3; s4. There are three cases:
– s3 is skip or (skip | skip). Then
〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s4, M〉, and T ≈ [M ].
For i ∈ {1, 2}, since si = skip; bs4ci,
〈bsci, bMci〉 7−→∗ 〈bs4ci, bMci〉. There-
fore, the lemma holds for this case.
– s3 is (s5 | skip) or (skip | s5) where
s5 is not skip. Without loss of general-
ity, suppose s3 is (s5 | skip). Then s1
is s5; bs4c1, and s2 is skip; bs4c1. Since
〈s5; bs4c1, bMc1〉 7−→ 〈s′1, M ′1〉, we
have 〈s5, bMc1〉 7−→ 〈s′5, M ′1〉 and s′1
is s′5; bs4c1. By (S11) and Lemma A.2,
〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈(s′5 | skip); s4, M ′〉, and
bM ′c1 = M ′1, and bM ′c2 = bMc2 = M2. It is
clear that statement (ii) holds.
– For i ∈ {1, 2}, bs3ci is not skip. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, because 〈si, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s′i, M ′i〉
and si = bs3ci; bs4ci, we have
〈bs3ci, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s3i, M ′i〉. By induction,
〈s3, M〉 7−→T 〈s′3, M ′〉, and statement (i)
or (ii) holds for T and s′3. Suppose state-
ment (i) holds for T and s3. Then for i ∈ {1, 2},
bT ci ≈ [Mi,M ′i ] and bs′3ci = s3i. By evalua-
tion rule (S2), 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s′3; s4, M ′〉. More-
over, we have bs′3; s4ci = s3i; bs4ci = s′i for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, the lemma holds. For the
case that statement (ii) holds for T and s3, the
same argument applies.
• s is (s3 | s4). In this case, s1 = s3 and s2 = s4.
Since 〈si, M〉 7−→ 〈s′i, M ′〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, we
have 〈s3, M〉1 7−→ 〈s′1, M ′′〉1 and 〈s4, M ′′〉2 7−→
〈s′2, M ′〉2. Therefore, 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈(s′1 | s′2), M ′〉
where T = [M,M ′′,M ′]. By Lemma A.2, bT ci ≈
[Mi,M ′i ] for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the lemma holds for
this case.
Lemma A.4 (Adequacy). Suppose 〈si, Mi〉 7−→Ti
〈s′i, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2} are two evaluations in Aimp. Then
for an AimpX configuration 〈s, M〉 such that bsci = si and
bMci = Mi for i ∈ {1, 2}, we have 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s′, M ′〉
such that bT cj ≈ Tj and bT ck ≈ T ′k, where T ′k is a pre-
fix of Tk and {k, j} = {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the sum of the lengths of T1 and T2:
|T1|+ |T2|.
• |T1| + |T2| ≤ 3. Without loss of generality, suppose
|T1| = 1. Then T1 = [M1]. Let T = [M ]. We have
〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s, M〉. It is clear that bT c1 = T1, and
bT c2 = [M2] is a prefix of T2.
• |T1| + |T2| > 3. If |T1| = 1 or |T2| = 1, then the
same argument in the above case applies. Otherwise,
we have 〈si, Mi〉 7−→ 〈s′′i , M ′′i 〉 7−→T
′
i 〈s′i, M ′i〉 and
Ti = [Mi] ⊕ T ′i for i ∈ {1, 2}. By Lemma A.3,
〈s, M〉 7−→T ′ 〈s′′, M ′′〉 such that
i. For i ∈ {1, 2}, bT ′ci ≈ [Mi,M ′′i ] and bs′′ci =
s′′i . Since |T ′1|+ |T ′2| < |T1|+ |T2|, by induction
we have 〈s′′, M ′′〉 7−→T ′′ 〈s′, M ′〉 such that for
{k, j} = {1, 2}, bT ′′cj ≈ T ′j and bT ′′ck ≈ T ′′k ,
and T ′′k is a prefix of T ′k. Let T = T ′ ⊕ T ′′.
Then 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s′, M ′〉, and bT cj ≈ Tj ,
and bT ck ≈ T ′k where T ′k = [Mk,M ′′k ]⊕T ′′k is a
prefix of Tk.
ii. For {j, k} = {1, 2}, bT ′cj ≈ [Mj ] and bscj =
sj , and bT ′ck ≈ [Mk,M ′′k ] and bsck = s′′k .
Without loss of generality, suppose j = 1 and
k = 2. Since 〈s1, M1〉 7−→T1 〈s′1, M ′1〉 and
〈s′′2 , M ′′〉 7−→T
′
2 〈s′2, M ′2〉, and bs′c1 = s1 and
bs′c2 = s′′2 , and |T ′2| < |T2|, we can apply the
induction hypothesis to 〈s′′, M ′′〉. By the simi-
lar argument in the above case, this lemma holds
for this case.
Lemma A.5 (Soundness). Suppose 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉.
Then 〈bsci, bMci〉 7−→∗ 〈bs′ci, bM ′ci〉.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈s, M〉 7−→
〈s′, M ′〉.
A.2. Typing rules
The type system of AimpX includes all the typing rules
in Figure 5 and has two additional rules for typing bracket
constructs. In general, both confidentiality and integrity
noninterference properties are instantiations of an abstract
noninterference property: inputs with security labels that
satisfy a condition V cannot affect outputs with security
labels that do not satisfy V . Two Aimp configurations are
called V -equivalent if they differ only at terms and memory
locations with security labels that satisfy V . The abstract
noninterference property means that the V -equivalence re-
lationship between two configurations is preserved during
evaluation.
The bracket constructs captures the differences between
two Aimp configurations. As a result, any effect and result
of a bracket construct should have a security label that sat-
isfies V . Let V (`) and V (int`) denote that ` satisfies V . If
v1 and v2 are not none, rule (V-PAIR) ensures that the value
(v1 | v2) has a label that satisfies V ; otherwise, there is no
constraint on the label of (v1 |v2), because none is indistin-
guishable from other values. In rule (S-PAIR), the premise
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V (pc′) ensures that the statement (s1 |s2) may have only ef-
fects with security labels that satisfy V .
[V-PAIR ]
Γ ` v1 : τ Γ ` v2 : τ
V (τ) or v1 = none or v2 = none
Γ ` (v1 | v2) : τ
[S-PAIR ]
Γ ;bRc1 ; pc′ ` s1 : τ
Γ ;bRc2 ; pc′ ` s2 : τ V (pc′)
Γ ;R ; pc ` (s1 | s2) : τ
Intuitively, noninterference between the inputs with la-
bels satisfying V and the outputs with labels that does not
satisfying V is achieved as long as all the bracket constructs
are well-typed.
An important constraint that condition V needs to satisfy
is that V (`) implies V (` unionsq `′) for any `′. In AimpX, if ex-
pression e is evaluated to a bracket value (n1 |n2), statement
if e then s1 else s2 would be reduced to a bracket state-
ment (s′1 |s′2) where s′i is either s1 or s2. To show (s′1 |s′2) is
well-typed, we need to show that s1 and s2 are well-typed
under a program-counter label that satisfying V , and we can
show it by using the constraint on V . Suppose e has type
int`, then we know that s1 and s2 are well-typed under the
program counter label pcunionsq `. Furthermore, ` satisfies V be-
cause the result of e is a bracket value. Thus, by the con-
straint that V (`) implies V (` unionsq `′), we have V (pc unionsq `).
Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` (s1 | s2) : τ , and m ∈ R. By the
evaluation rule (S11), it is possible that 〈(s1 |s2), M〉 7−→∗
〈(s′1 | s2), M ′〉 and M ′(m) = (n | none), which means
that m still needs to be assigned in s2, but not in s′1. As-
sume there exists R′ such that Γ ;R′ ; pc ` (s′1 | s2) : τ .
Then by rule (S-PAIR), we have Γ ;bR′c1 ; pc ` s′1 : τ
and Γ ;bR′c2 ; pc ` s2 : τ . Intuitively, we want to have
m 6∈ bR′c1 and m ∈ bR′c2, which are consistent with M ′.
To indicate such a situation, a reference m in R may have
an index: m1 or m2 means that m needs to be assigned only
in the first or second component of a bracket statement, and
m• is the same as m. The projection of R is computed in
the following way:
bRci = {m | mi ∈ R ∨m ∈ R}
Note that indexed references are not allowed to appear in
a statement type stmtR. To make this explicit, we require
that the type stmtR is well-formed only if R does not
contain any indexed reference mi. For convenience, we in-
troduce two notations dealing with indexed reference sets.
Let the notation R ≤ R′ denote bRc1 ⊆ bR′c1 and
bRc2 ⊆ bR′c2, and let R−mi denote the reference set ob-
tained by eliminating mi from R, and it is computed as fol-
lows:
R−mi =
{ R′ if R = R′ ∪ {mj} ∧ i ∈ {j, •}
R′ ∪ {mj} if R = R′ ∪ {m} ∧ {i, j} = {1, 2}
R if otherwise
A.3. Subjection reduction
Lemma A.6 (Update). If Γ ;R ` v : τ and Γ ;R ` v′ : τ ,
then Γ ;R ` v[v′/pii] : τ .
Proof. If i is •, then v[v′/pii] = v′, and we have Γ ` v′ : τ .
If i is 1, then v[v′/pii] = (v′ | bvc2). Since Γ ` v : τ , we
have Γ ` bvc2 : τ . By rule (V-PAIR), Γ ` (v′ | bvc2) : τ .
Similarly, if i is 2, we also have Γ ` v[v′/pii] : τ .
Lemma A.7 (Relax). If Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` s : τ , then
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ;R ; pcunionsq ` ` s :
τ .
Lemma A.8. Suppose Γ ;R ` e : τ , and Γ ` M , and
〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. Then Γ ;R ` v : τ .
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Lemma A.9. Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR′ . If mi ∈ R
where i ∈ {1, 2}, then m 6∈ R′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ;R ; pc ` s :
stmtR′ .
Definition A.1 (Γ ` M ). Γ ` M if dom(Γ) = dom(M),
and for any m ∈ dom(Γ), Γ ;R `M(m) : Γ(m).
Definition A.2 (Γ ;R ` M ). A memory M is consistent
with Γ, R, written Γ ;R ` M , if Γ ` M , and for any m
in dom(M) such that AΓ(m) 6≤ L, M(m) = none implies
m ∈ R, and M(m) = (none | n) implies m1 ∈ R, and
M(m) = (n | none) implies m2 ∈ R.
Theorem A.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc `
s : τ , and Γ ` M , and 〈s, M〉i 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉i, and
i ∈ {1, 2} implies V (pc). Then there exists R′ such that
the following statements hold:
i. Γ ;R′ ; pc ` s′ : τ , and R′ ≤ R, and Γ `M ′.
ii. For any mj ∈ R−R′, bM ′ci(mj) 6= none.
iii. Suppose V (`) is I(`) ≤ L. Then Γ ;R ` bMci implies
Γ ;R′ ` bM ′ci.
iv. If bMci(m) = none, and bM ′ci(m) = n, and
A(Γ(m)) 6≤ I(pc), then m 6∈ R′.
Proof. By induction on the evaluation step 〈s, M〉i 7−→
〈s′, M ′〉i. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
derivation of Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ does not end with using the
(SUB) rule. Indeed, if Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR2 is derived
by Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR1 and Γ ;R ; pc ` stmtR1 ≤
stmtR2 , and there exists R′′ such that statements (i)–(iv)
hold for Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR1 , then by Lemma A.9, we
can show that R′ = R′′ ∪ (R2 − R1) satisfies statements
(i)–(iv) for Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR2 .
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• Case (S1). In this case, s is m := e, s′ is skip, and τ
is stmtR−{m}. By (S1), M ′ is M [m 7→M(m)[v/pii]].
By Lemma A.8, we have Γ ` v : Γ(m), which
implies that M(m)[v/pii] has type Γ(m). Therefore,
Γ ` M ′. The well-formedness of τ implies that R
does not contain any indexed references. Let R′ be
R − {m}. It is clear that R′ ≤ R. By rule (SKIP),
Γ ;R′ ; pc ` skip : stmtR′ . Because bM ′ci(m) =
v 6= none, and R − R′ = {m}, statement (ii) holds.
Since bM ′ci(m) = n and R − R′ = {m}, we have
that Γ ;R ` bMci implies Γ ;R′ ;L ` bM ′ci.
• Case (S2). Obvious by induction.
• Case (S3). Trivial.
• Case (S4). In this case, s is if e then s1 else s2. By
the typing rule (IF), we have Γ ;R ; pcunionsq`e ` s1 : τ . By
Lemma A.7, Γ ;R ; pc ` s1 : τ . In this case, M ′ = M
and R′ = R, so statements (ii) and (iii) immediately
hold.
• Case (S5). By the similar argument of case (S4).
• Case (S6). In this case, s is while e do s1, and τ is
stmtR. By rule (WHILE), Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` s1 : τ ,
where ` is the label of e. Then we have
Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` s1; while e do s1 : τ . Further-
more, Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` skip : stmtR. By rule (IF),
Γ ;R ; pc ` if e then s; while e do s else skip : τ .
Since M ′ = M and R′ = R, statements (ii) and (iii)
hold.
• Case (S10). In this case, s is if e then s1 else s2,
and i must be •. Suppose Γ ` e : int`. By
Lemma A.8, Γ ` (n1 | n2) : int`. By rule (V-
PAIR), V (`) holds, which implies V (pc unionsq `).
By rule (IF), Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` si : τ , which im-
plies Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` if ni then bs1ci else bs2ci : τ .
By rule (S-PAIR), Γ ;R ; pc ` s′ : τ . Again, since
M ′ = M and R′ = R, statements (ii) and (iii) hold.
• Case (S11). In this case, s is (s1 | s2). Without loss
of generality, suppose 〈s1, M〉1 7−→ 〈s′1, M ′〉1,
and 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈(s′1 | s2), M ′〉. By rule (S-PAIR),
Γ ;bRc1 ; pc ` s1 : τ . By induction, there ex-
ists R′1 such that Γ ;R′1 ; pc ` s′1 : τ , and R′1 ⊆ bRc1,
and Γ ` M ′. Let R′ be R′1 • bRc2, which is com-
puted by the formula:
R1 • R2 = {m | m ∈ R1 ∩R2} ∪
{m1 | m ∈ R1 −R2} ∪
{m2 | m ∈ R2 −R1}
Since bR′c1 = R′1 and bR′c2 = bRc2, we have
Γ ;bR′c1 ; pc ` s′1 : τ . By rule (S-PAIR), Γ ;R′ ; pc `
s′ : τ holds. Since bR′c2 = bRc2, for any mj ∈ R −
R′, it must be the case that j = 1, andm ∈ bRc1−R′1.
By induction, bM ′c1(m) 6= none. Therefore, state-
ments (ii) holds.
If Γ ;R `M , then Γ ;bRc1 ` bMc1. By induction,
Γ ;R′1 ` bM ′c1. Therefore, Γ ;R′ `M ′ holds.
• Case (S12). In this case, s is (skip | skip). We have
Γ ;bRci ; pc ` skip : stmtbRci for i ∈ {1, 2}.
By rule (S-PAIR), Γ ;bRci ; pc′ ` skip : τ . There-
fore, Γ ;bRci ; pc′ ` stmtbRci ≤ τ . By the subtyp-
ing rule, τ = stmtbRci . So bRc1 = bRc2 = R and
τ = stmtR. By rule (SKIP), Γ ;R ; pc ` skip : τ .
A.4. Progress
Theorem A.2 (Progress). Let V (`) be I(`) ≤ L, and let
|s| represent the size of the statement s, i.e. the number of
syntactical tokens in s. Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` s : stmtR′ and
Γ ;R ` M . If AΓ(R) 6≤ L then there exists 〈s′, M ′〉 such
that 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉. Furthermore, if bRc1 6= bRc2,
then |s′| < |s|.
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
A.5. Noninterference
Theorem A.3 (Confidentiality noninterference). If
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ , then Γ ` NIC(s).
Proof. Given two memories M1 and M2 in Aimp, let M =
M1 unionmultiM2 be an AimpX memory computed as follows:
M1unionmultiM2(m) =
{
M1(m) if M1(m) = M2(m)
(M1(m) |M2(m)) if M1(m) 6= M2(m)
Let V (`) be C(`) 6≤ L. Then Γ ` M1 ≈C≤L M2 im-
plies that Γ ` M . Suppose 〈si, Mi〉 7−→Ti 〈s′i, M ′〉 for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Then by Lemma A.4, there exists 〈s′, M ′〉
such that 〈s, M〉 7−→T 〈s′, M ′〉, and bT cj ≈ Tj and
bT ck ≈ T ′k where {j, k} = {1, 2} and T ′k is a prefix of
Tj . By Theorem A.1, for each M ′ in T , Γ ` M ′, which
implies that bM ′c1 ≈C≤L bM ′c2. Therefore, we have
Γ ` Tj ≈C≤L T ′k. Thus, Γ ` NIC(s).
Theorem A.4 (Integrity noninterference). If Γ ;R ; pc `
s : τ , then Γ ` NII(s).
Proof. Let V (`) be I(`) ≤ I . By the same argument as
in the proof of the confidentiality noninterference theo-
rem.
Lemma A.10 (Balance). Let V (`) be I(`) ≤ L. Suppose
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ , and Γ ;R ` M . There exists 〈s′, M ′〉
such that 〈s, M〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M ′〉, and Γ ` bM ′c1 ≈A 6≤L
bM ′c2.
Proof. By induction of on the size of s.
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• |s| = 1. In this case, s must be skip. However,
Γ ;R ; pc ` skip : stmtR implies bRc1 = bRc2,
which is followed by Γ ` bMc1 ≈A 6≤L bMc2 because
Γ ;R `M .
• |s| > 1. By the definition of Γ ;R ` M , Γ `
bMc1 6≈A 6≤L bMc2 implies bRc1 6= bRc2. By the
progress theorem, 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′〉 and |s′| < |s|.
By the subject reduction theorem, there exists R′ such
that Γ ;R′ ; pc ` s′ : τ and Γ ;R′ ;L ` M ′. By induc-
tion, 〈s′, M ′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′, M ′′〉 and Γ ` bM ′′c1 ≈A 6≤L
bM ′′c2.
Theorem A.5 (Availability noninterference). If
Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ , then Γ ;R ` NIA(s).
Proof. Let V (`) be I(`) ≤ L. Given two memories M1 and
M2 in Aimp such that Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤L M2 and for any m in
dom(Γ), m 6∈ R and A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L imply Mi(m) 6= none.
To prove Γ ` NIA(s), we only need to show that there
exists 〈s′i, M ′i〉 such that 〈s, Mi〉 7−→∗ 〈s′i, M ′i〉, and for
any 〈s′′i , M ′′i 〉 such that 〈s′i, M ′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′i , M ′′〉, Γ `
M ′′1 ≈A 6≤L M ′′2 holds.
LetM = M1unionmultiM2. Intuitively, by Lemma A.10, evaluat-
ing 〈s, M〉 will eventually result in a memory M ′ such that
Γ ` bM ′c1 ≈A 6≤L bM ′c2, and if any high-availability ref-
erence m is unavailable in M ′, m will remain unavailable.
This conclusion can be projected to 〈s, Mi〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}
by Lemma A.5.
Suppose there exists 〈s′, M ′〉 such that 〈s, M〉 7−→∗
〈s′, M ′〉, and for any m with AΓ(m) 6≤ L,
bM ′ci 6= none for i ∈ {1, 2}. By Lemma A.5,
〈s, Mi〉 7−→∗ 〈bs′ci, bM ′ci〉. Moreover, for any 〈s′i, M ′i〉
such that 〈bs′ci, bM ′ci〉 7−→∗ 〈s′i, M ′i〉, and any m with
AΓ(m) 6≤ L, it must be the case that M ′i(m) 6= none.
Therefore, Γ `M ′1 ≈A 6≤L M ′2.
Otherwise, there exists 〈s′, M ′〉 such that
〈s, M〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M ′〉, there exists m such that
A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L and bM ′ci(m) ≈none for some i ∈ {1, 2},
and for any 〈s′′, M ′′〉 such that 〈s′, M ′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′, M ′′〉,
Γ ` bM ′ci ≈A 6≤L bM ′′ci. By Lemma A.10,
Γ ` bM ′c1 ≈A 6≤L bM ′c2 must hold. Otherwise, as-
sume Γ ` bM ′c1 ≈A 6≤L bM ′c2 does not hold. Then there
exists 〈s′′, M ′′〉 such that 〈s′, M ′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′, M ′′〉
and Γ ` bM ′′c1 ≈A 6≤L bM ′′c2. Because for
i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ` bM ′ci ≈A 6≤L bM ′′ci, we have
Γ ` bM ′c1 ≈A 6≤L bM ′c2, which contradicts the original
assumption. In addition, we can show that 〈s′, M ′〉 would
diverge and generate a trace of infinite size. Indeed, by The-
orem A.1, there exists R′ such that Γ ;R′ ; pc ` s′ : τ ,
and Γ ;R′ ;L ` M ′. Then A(R′) 6≤ L, because there ex-
ists m such that A(Γ(m)) 6≤ L and bM ′ci(m) ≈none
for some i ∈ {1, 2}. By Theorem A.2, there exists
〈s′′, M ′′〉 such that 〈s′, M ′〉 7−→ 〈s′′, M ′′〉. Since
Γ ` bM ′ci ≈A 6≤L bM ′′ci for i ∈ {1, 2}, 〈s′′, M ′′〉 can
make progress by the same argument. Therefore, eval-
uating 〈s′, M ′〉 will generate a trace of infinite size.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, suppose there exists 〈s′i, M ′i〉 such that
〈bs′ci, bM ′ci〉 7−→∗ 〈s′i, M ′i〉. Since the trace from eval-
uating 〈s′, M ′〉 is infinitely long, for i ∈ {1, 2}, there ex-
ists 〈s′′i , M ′′i 〉 such that 〈s′, M ′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′i , M ′′〉 and
bM ′′i ci = M ′i . Therefore, Γ ` M ′i ≈A 6≤L bM ′ci for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, Γ `M ′1 ≈A 6≤L M ′2.
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